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| | Suriname globalises: ‘by design or by default’? Address delivered on the 1st of November 2001 on the occasion of the 33rd Dies Natalis of the Anton de Kom University of Suriname H.R.Lim A Po Contents:
Part I
1. The globalisation process
2. The historical perspective
3. Empirical effects
4. Normative responses
Part II
5. Starting points
6. ‘By design or by default’?
7. Institutional challenges
8. Points of reference
1. The globalisation process Like most political concepts the meaning of globalisation and its political, economic and social references is a moot point.
The English political scientist Anthony Giddens suggests a definition that is often referred to. According to him globalisation is “the intensification of global social relationships which often connect far distance places in such a manner that events in one place impact on circumstances in other places, and vice versa”.
Many complex issues are hidden behind this simple definition. I will start with listing a few.
By cutting across physical barriers of time and space and across traditional state boundaries, globalisation creates a new framework, a new economic, political and social world-order. This new world-order causes fundamental and far-reaching changes in all structures of society.
Do these changes also result in a just and democratically organised global community or is it just a continuation of the unbalanced process of modernisation that has been going on for centuries?
Encroachment on the sovereignty of states is inherent to the globalisation concept. Emphasis lies on economic actors who consider the world as their market. Production is no longer confined to one single country, but it now extends to different countries in a complex process in which final products are destined for consumers all over the world.
Globalisation also affects many international political institutions (such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation) as well as social movements and target groups which try to steer social life all over the world in new directions (such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International).
What now is the legitimacy of the legal order originating from these new dynamics?
An extra dimension to these globalisation issues concerns the asymmetry in the impact which decisions have on global matters depending on whether these decisions are taken in the industrialised countries or in the developing world.
Decisions taken in industrialised countries, for example the ‘G8’, decidedly impact on each political and economic domain in the world, contrary to many important events happening in the Third World which hardly have any or no effect at all on the global order. This asymmetry also becomes the most important reason why globalisation is being considered and experienced differently, both empirically and normatively, by the people in the core and those living in the periphery of global politics.
What are the implications for national policy?
It is of course impossible to exhaust even one of these questions in my address this evening. I have to limit myself to shedding some light on a few general points.
In the first part of my presentation I will start with a brief summary of the historical perspective of globalisation and continue with a number of aspects of current empirical and normative perceptions of this process.
The second part of my presentation deals with policy issues. The issues I will raise involve the starting points from which policy choices are to be made, how these choices look like and what their consequences and challenges are. My subsequent remarks are meant to give an impulse to reflect on the way in which these consequences and challenges can be seen as points of reference for a desirable societal ideal. In the end, I will briefly summarise my principal conclusions.
2. The Historic Perspective
In the past century two waves of globalisation preceded the current one. The first wave occurred in the fifty years preceding the First World War. This period was characterised by a strong growth of trade and financial and migration flows. Growth was particularly strong between 1870 and 1914 when a ‘global currency’ ruled as a result of ‘the gold standard’. England was the leading economy. Other features were the flourishing of European colonialism in Africa, Asia and South America and important technological innovations in industry, transportation and communications. Finally the emergence of the big ‘financial trust’ and ‘joint stock corporation’ in Europe and the United States and of the ‘zaibatsu’ in Japan. All these factors reinforced the oligopolistic nature of competition in the leading economies.
After the great depression of the thirties and the Second World War the next wave of globalisation set in. This one extended into the fifties and sixties. The United States became the undisputed leader of the capitalist world and the dollar became the international currency under the Bretton Woods system. International trade was stimulated through a further improvement of the transportation- and communication networks. Tariff reductions on the global scene as a result of GATT and the European Common Market also contributed towards this growth. Not only was the growth of trade spectacular, but so was the increasing role of multinational enterprises as economic actors on the world scene and the increase of direct foreign investments by American companies in particular.
The current wave of globalisation which started at the end of the nineteen-seventies, was mainly a result of policy measures taken by the American- and European government in response to ‘stagflation’ and ‘eurosclerosis’ respectively, both phenomena halting economic growth at the end of the nineteen-sixties. Other developments followed, information technologies flourished, financial markets globalised, shifts from ‘inward to outward oriented growth strategies’ took place in many developing countries, a growing general concern of the environment manifested itself, the bipolarity and ideological conflicts in international politics came to an end and competition and co-operation between companies intensified.
There are clearly two opposing views on how the current wave of globalisation should be understood against this historical perspective.
On the one end of the spectrum we have the ‘despairing’, who opine that nothing fundamental has changed in the unbalanced character of the ongoing modernisation process, and on the other end we encounter the ‘reformers’ who are of the belief that the current globalisation wave does represent a new era in the history of mankind at least qualitatively.
In my mind both views represent over-simplifications. The history of ideas, Nietsche teaches us, is a matter of “shades of grey rather than black and white”.
Globalisation is closely intertwined with industrialisation and modernisation. These phenomena intrinsically have unbalanced effects resulting in marginalisation of developing countries. Marginalisation therefore will in principle, be always part of the globalisation process.
However, on the other hand we should not overlook the fact that the globalisation wave we’re now experiencing, definitely will be different from earlier waves when it comes to its intensity and its ramifications. This is true due to the synchronicity, synergy and the scope of the factors that cause it. They cover the entire economic, political, social and even the cultural spectrum of societal life. As a consequence issues pertaining to basic values of human society become topical. Some of us are inclined to consider these specific traits as essential and therefore consider the current globalisation wave to be fundamentally different from the previous ones.
Hence my proposition that the course of this third globalisation wave will likely be influenced both by aspects of imbalance and marginalisation, which so far have characterised industrialisation and modernisation, as well as by aspects of solidarity and humanitarianism, which are gaining a higher profile in the world of today.
This conclusion finds its striking expression in what is called in the United Nations Development Report of 1999, the ‘paradox of globalisation’: “The collapse of space, time and borders may well be creating the global village, but not everyone will be a citizen. The global, professional elite will face low borders, while billions of other people will be confronted with borders as high as ever”.
3. Empirical effects
To illustrate how this paradox currently takes shape, I will now expound on a number of effects of globalisation in the world and how they are experienced ‘as a reality’.
Economists in particular postulate that globalisation increases general welfare in the world, because it enlarges opportunities for efficiency gains through economies of scale and increased international specialisation. Mainly by letting the forces of competition in the world market take their course; forces which channel the energy of people and resources of countries into activities, which are the most productive.
This appreciation of the effects of globalisation is incomplete in several respects. It disregards the non-economic effects of globalisation, such as the emergence of global standards of ‘good governance’, environmental protection, health care and the fight against poverty. And of equal importance, the general positive appreciation of the economic effects of globalisation is not universally shared.
I would like to discuss three specific controversial areas. The first one concerns the effect on the existing gap between rich and poor countries; the second relates to the effect of the bundling of forces in regional organisations and the third regards the impact of the new forms of ‘global law’.
There exists a feeling of disappointment and concern in the world today about the fact that the process of globalisation, with its emphasis on free trade, has so far not resulted in solving a number of fundamental political, economic and social issues in developing countries and in their relationship to the rest of the world. The gap between ‘rich and poor’ and the backlog in human and technological capabilities of the Third World countries are only becoming bigger. Additionally, their political and strategic importance and influence is waning. These developments perpetuate the inequality in gaining access to, in reaping the benefits of and in shaping the processes of globalisation.
On the other hand, there are no built in checks and balances to prevent the industrialised countries from abusing their social, economic and political predominance in the current global order. This is why these countries have all the room to shape the globalisation processes in a form and content which are to their own liking and which will only benefit them even to the detriment of the developing world.
Both these circumstances, the inhibiting backlog of the developing countries and the ever-growing headstart of the industrialised countries do form a huge threat to the effectiveness and stability of the intended global system of free trade.
Regionalisation is one response to the challenges of globalisation and is aimed at integration of economies to increase their economic viability and competitiveness. One owns state power is also being enlarged through regional co-operation. That is why it is assumed that globalisation and regionalisation go hand in hand and reinforce each other.
However, some reservations are appropriate. The effects of regionalisation on general welfare are only positive against the background of the economic goals of globalisation in as far as they are ‘trade creating’, and not ‘trade diverting’. In the latter case governments do not only bundle their state power with the objective of increasing their effectiveness and intensifying intra-regional activities, but also to exclude as much as possible trade with countries from outside the region. Such a strategy could result in fragmentation of the global trade system in a number of closed and relatively hostile regional blocs. The negative effects of this would probably be disproportionate for ‘weak countries’ outside the big trading blocs.
Sceptisism has also been expressed with regard to the social legitimacy of the new forms of global law emanating from the framework of world globalisation. New global legal systems with a broad scope and with relative autonomy exert strong normative powers on and condition the sovereign power of individual states. However, their social legitimacy is not accordingly.
What is lacking on a global level is a coherent and all-encompassing political system that guarantees democratic norms and values. State bodies are not capable of exercising control over the supranational processes on which the global rules are founded. Rules that, due to their autonomous nature, cannot be considered a reflection of the result of negotiations within state bodies.
4. Normative responses
The underlying values and standards of the globalisation process are being challenged by these and other effects of globalisation.
Here again, I would like to restrict myself to three aspects. The first has to do with the supremacy of the Western democratic capitalist system. The second relates to the notion that development entails ‘human development’ and the third concerns the demand for social justice. These three aspects relate to moral viewpoints and in my opinion constitute critical elements of the globalisation process.
At the end of the nineteen-seventies both in the United States and Europe a capitalist market based economy combined with a parliamentary democratic state became the standard. With the demise of the Soviet Union in the nineteen-eighties these economic and political orientations, typified, as ‘market plus democracy’ became universally dominant. They are considered to justify normatively the current globalisation wave in that the globalisation of economic markets will lead to the reduction of inequalities; that new international institutions will stimulate co-operation and that globalisation will result in convergence of ideologies. The question just raised about at least part of these outcomes has advanced a redefinition of the development objectives of Third World countries and has initiated a growing universal moral awareness.
During the last decade development as a universal objective has been subject to a thorough reorientation. The impact of a human rights policy, strongly advocated since the nineteen-seventies, appeared to have been ineffective in reducing existing inequalities between and within countries. This human rights policy did not achieve the objective of involving more people in the mainstream of overall economic development; neither did it result in a fair distribution of the benefits of development. The new concept of development as ‘human development’ aims at setting off this shortcoming. Development objectives have been broadened in order to include the development of human capacities and the freedoms and rights as actually enjoyed by the people as well. Basic to this new approach of developmental thinking is the concept of development that centres on efficiency, sustainability and fairness.
A plea, especially from the Third World, for greater moral awareness in the world has also triggered a discussion on the principle of social justice applicable between states in a globalising world. Two contrasting views dominate this discussion.
The first view refers to the ‘entitlement theory of equality’ as embodied in the ‘Fifth Amendment’ of the Constitution of the United States. The essence of this theory deals with the principle that acquisition or distribution is fair and also remains fair as long as it took place on the basis of the rules that were valid at the time of the acquisition or distribution. This principle only reinforces historic inequalities and leaves no room for correction from the viewpoint of fairness through future distribution and acquisition.
When applying this principle to the international society, the weak moral content of the existing world order will clearly surface. It confirms a large degree of inequality and unequal distribution of goods which, on moral as well as on political grounds, is unacceptable for large parts of humanity. The unequal rights, which this theory protects, are additionally morally suspicious because those rights were acquired at a time when the peoples of the Third World had no voice in establishing the rules for legitimate acquisition and distribution of goods. Finally, according to utilitarian standards, the consolidation of existing inequalities is dysfunctional. A few enjoy much larger rewards than needed in order to stimulate productivity, while the vast majority is being deprived of the essentials for the development of their full productive potential.
The current course of the discussion about ‘global social justice’ fortunately points into the direction of an increasing prevalence of a ‘countervailing theory of fairness’ of which the so-called ‘difference principle’ forms the essence. John Rawls, an American philosopher, developed the principle at the beginning of the nineteen-seventies. On technical grounds he himself was reluctant to apply the principle beyond relationships-within-nations to relationships between nations. However, the principle is presently being considered by quite a number of authorities to be extremely useful and appropriate as a concept for justice for the ‘emergent global community’.
This principle implies that inequalities resulting from acquisition and distribution of goods cannot be justified on historical grounds. It is based on the premise that distribution or acquisition should result in such benefits for the underprivileged that inequalities become smaller. From the perspective of development and with a view to justice, inequalities as policy options are therefore only permitted if and when they contribute at least to the long-term expectations of the marginalised segments of global society.
5. Starting points
Now I have come to the second part of my presentation. In this part, I will deal with the implications of globalisation for our national policies. In the foregoing I have touched upon different empirical and normative aspects of globalisation and each of those aspects turned out to be problematic. That is why the legitimate question can be asked which should be starting points for the development of our national policies.
The answer to this question cannot be found by making predictions about the future. The future is too uncertain. It is possible, however, to make assumptions about the course of the globalisation process in the world and to develop on the basis thereof scenarios that can serve as a frame of reference for systematic thinking on possible future developments and strategic policy choices.
I would like to suggest the current globalisation process in the world to develop along the lines of two alternative scenarios. Both scenarios are based on the assumption that the globalisation process is irreversible and inevitable.
The first scenario is further based on the assumption that globalisation should be understood as something that encroaches on us, not only as an idea, or as a concept related to a historical process, but also as an ideology. This ideology is advocated by the industrialised world without sufficiently taking into account the interests of developing countries. However, strong notions of international justice and global moral solidarity will reverse this attitude of the industrialised world. In a period of stability and economic growth this change will form the platform for globalisation as an ideal that will steer the course of the globalisation process in favour of developing countries. A long road has to be travelled. However, it is a journey, which certainly is worthy, because the final destination in this scenario will reveal a new version of solidarity, of ‘civic friendship within a flourishing global community’, based on a universally accepted concept of social justice.
In the other scenario the assumption is made that the current globalisation wave will lead to increased marginalisation of the developing countries. Because the underlying causes for their marginalisation in the Westphalian international system have not disappeared. Despite the principles of sovereignty and justice on which the system is founded, the developed countries exercise power in their own interest and are insensitive of the cultural diversity of the Third World.
In this scenario the new dynamics of the new ‘global political economy’ will maintain or even reinforce the marginalisation process. One can think of a further convergence of transatlantic viewpoints and interests, a further decline of the strategic influence developing countries have in international politics, a further increase in the power of ‘non-state actors’, in particular multinational companies, an increasing technological backlog of developing countries, ‘cultural imperialism’ and a continuous lack of social legitimacy of global law.
Marginalisation of developing countries, as a complex and alarming phenomenon will run its course and it will remain unclear where it will take large parts of humanity. And this uncertain course lasts in this scenario as one of the most important empirical and normative challenges of the 21st century.
6. ‘By design’ or ‘by default’?
How can these scenarios be of use to policy-makers in developing countries like Suriname? First of all, when analysing and considering national strategic policy choices, the starting point of both scenarios has to be taken as a fact. In other words, globalisation, also from the perspective of Third World countries is an irreversible and inevitable development.
Secondly, it should be assumed that reality would follow a path within the confines of these two scenarios. To decrease the risks of the future uncertainty as much as possible, strategic options need to be identified and the option that appears to be most robust under both scenarios needs to be selected.
What then are our strategic options? In developing a line of thinking I would like to make reference to Karl Marx’s statement: “Men make their own history; but not under conditions of their own choosing”. The conditions are those of globalisation: The political, economic, cultural and legal landscape of the ‘global era’ has already been either charted or mapped by the ‘globalised states’ and ‘non-state actors’ of the ‘developed world’.
Does this mean that we should undergo the globalisation process slavishly? Does it mean that we have to swallow neo-liberal values pushed down our throats by the ‘global power centre’? And are we therefore left with no or only few and very limited possibilities to shape our own society? Can we choose from other than neo-liberal structures and patterns, which are being dictated to us by the global context? Globalisation ‘by default’ – which means by ‘doing nothing’ - is indeed an option, but that’s all it is.
Although we cannot set the conditions of globalisation in the present global context to our own liking Marx, rightly so, suggests that we can still determine our own future. Globalisation ‘by design’, according to one’s own vision is indeed an alternative option. It should be admitted however that the margins for our choices are narrow. But they will nevertheless offer us room to influence conditions, which are not firm and unambiguous, and to mold them according to our own needs as the future evolves.
It is clear that under both scenarios preference should be given to devise and develop the process and content of globalisation by our active involvement. Because that will enable us to make use of the opportunities which the ‘solidarity scenario’ offers and to stand the threats of the ‘marginalisation scenario’.
Globalisation ‘by design’ requires close monitoring of global developments and continuously increasing our understanding of those developments, enabling us to make responsible choices. Choices which, in interaction with uncertain external factors, will determine the form and content of our globalisation. Choices which are difficult, because they cannot be made simply in terms of good and bad, but presume a well thought about balance of the positive and negative effects of globalisation, taking into account our own set of moral norms and values and our own strategic development goals.
7. Institutional Challenges
The most important precondition for our policymakers for making responsible choices, is our own institutional framework. What is meant here is that from the viewpoint of effectiveness our national institutions, laws and regulations need to converge for a large degree with the universal institutional frameworks of both scenarios. Three reforms of our institutional framework are in my view essential.
The first reform concerns a reorientation of the regulatory mechanisms of our society.
Our current political and economic order is still based on the ‘state plus market’ model, which was predominant in the nineteen-sixties. This model is enshrined in our Constitution and the reality of our economy is in conformity. The rationale is to vest the primacy for social structuring with government and politics through controlling and supplementing the role of the market system.
Since the nineteen-seventies, the ‘state plus market’ model came under increasing pressure in the industrialised world. To halt economic deterioration and to stimulate their economies, governments felt compelled to privatise and deregulate companies, to outsource public services, to cut government spending and to lower taxes.
A fundamental shift from the primacy of the government to that of the market also has set in, in most developing countries. However, real integration into developments in the industrialised countries is a painful and long-lasting process for many Third World countries, often due to a mix of ideological rigidity and lack of resources. To some extent that is also true for Suriname. A paradigm shift from ‘government’ to ‘market’ and integration in the industrialised world are absolute prerequisites for an effective involvement in the globalisation process. And no one will dare to deny that in this case the conventional wisdom: ‘he laughs best who laughs last’ will come off badly against the merchant wisdom: ‘first come, first served’.
The second institutional reform regards the micro-economic dimension of globalisation.
In economic terms globalisation refers to economic activities transcending national and regional political boundaries. However, one should not loose sight that globalisation as such is driven by activities within national borders of individual economic actors, such as companies, banks and other entrepreneurs. And their success in a globalising world is dependent on the manner in which they organise their production activities in order to be competitive and profitable.
During the first and second globalisation wave Taylorism was the leading production philosophy. This philosophy was characterised by a strict separation between ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’, by the ‘assembly line’ and by a high degree of specialisation and emphasis on the notion that there is only ‘one best way’ of producing.
At the end of the nineteen-seventies flexible production is gradually taking over from Taylorism. Initially as a reaction to ‘stagflation’ and ‘eurosclerosis’ in the United States and Europe, and afterwards stimulated by the development of flexible automated technologies, deregulation and globalisation of competition and co-operation between companies. In the meantime flexible organisations have become the standard all over the industrialised world. Their focus is on reducing any form of waste, on production and productivity increase, on continuous innovation and quality improvement through integration of ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’ at all working levels and on encouraging ‘teamwork’.
In the past decades Suriname’s development strategies were mainly focussed on infrastructure and on macro-economic and financial stabilisation programmes as conditions for economic development and growth. Unfortunately, insufficient attention has been paid to a production culture that fits the current globalising world. A culture that has to be considered a critical success factor for development and growth. The pace and the extent to which we succeed in integrating this new philosophy of human organisation within our society – within private and other production companies as well as within the government – will largely determine our competitive power and thus the course of our globalisation process.
The third reform concerns a shift from a neo-colonial to a regional development orientation.
The orientation during the past 25 years in our development thinking on co-operation with our former coloniser has not resulted in establishing the preconditions for a sustainable developing economy. There exists a large discrepancy between what we had expected from this orientation in terms of development and what has been achieved. I am tempted to regard the asymmetry that characterised the relationship between both countries in almost every field of our co-operation as the most important cause for this discrepancy. This asymmetry unfortunately has only increased over the years.
With Suriname’s accession as a full member of the Caribbean Community (Caricom) and of other regional organisations, our state power and our effectiveness within the dynamics of the globalisation process have potentially increased through bundling of Member States of those organisations. To be able to take advantage of these opportunities of integration, we should direct our policy towards realisation of added value of co-operation and this assumes a ‘real commitment’ towards the relevant organisations. However, it also requires ambition and effort to realise our political and socio-economic goals on the basis of equality and freedom of choices. These being the fundamentals of this form of co-operation in contrast with those of neo colonial structures.
8. Points of reference for a societal ideal
Are there any references to be found in the foregoing for a societal ideal, which in interaction with the globalisation process in the world could give further direction to our development? Could the proposed institutional reforms, which are recommended with effectiveness in mind, also be recommended from an ethical viewpoint?
I am inclined to answer these questions affirmatively and in support thereof I would like to share, before closing, some further thoughts with you about a number of fundamental concepts. Concepts that were discussed earlier and which, in my opinion, could be considered appropriate anchors for a desirable societal ideal.
The concepts which I make reference of are those of social justice and social legitimacy as dimensions of the ‘market plus democracy’ model, development as ‘human development’ and flexible production as a philosophy of human action. The concept of social justice of Rawls can claim growing recognition as a global standard. It reflects a proper balance of the basic values of freedom, equality and solidarity as regulatory principles of society. According to Rawls the principal subject of justice is the manner in which fundamental rights and obligations and the added value of social co-operation are being distributed by the most important social institutions. The two core principles of his theory are the ’equality principle’ laying emphasis on equality of freedom and opportunities and the ‘difference principle’ in which solidarity constitutes the basic value. In the structuring of the institutions dealing with the distribution of public goods, both principles have the desirable effect of eliminating social and economic inequalities instead of maintaining the historic achievements of the ‘entitlement theory’. In shaping the institutions it is also important that the largest possible social legitimacy is being achieved. The demand for social legitimacy is opportune in light of the need for involvement of civil society in the formulation of administrative and policy measures outside the traditional political system. It is about the requirement of which Jem Bendell, a political scientist strikingly says: “All forms of government should be democratic. By this I mean that all forms of organisation should facilitate the recognition of value in people and between people.” This means that administration and policy should not only be concerned with functioning of ‘the market’ and ‘the government’, but should also strive for healthy institutions of civil society. Such an approach meets the needs of the people in identifying with their own society and with the rest of the world, realising that the value of their own life will to a large degree be a reflection and a function thereof.
Redefining the concept of development as ‘human development’ in the past ten years is aiming at broadening the rights of freedom that people enjoy as an additional goal and a means for development and growth.
The World Bank undertook the most important effort to this effect. In addition to the protection of human rights, it currently considers ‘inclusion’ as the most important challenge. It is about the pursuit of reducing inequalities between and within nations, of involving more people into the ‘economic mainstream’ and of achieving a more equitable distribution of social goods. The realisation of this pursuit depends on well functioning institutions, such as the market economy and the legal system, adequate infrastructure, but more importantly, on institutions like our University, that needs to implement a policy which is particularly geared towards developing the human potential.
Finally, the concept of flexible production. This concept, in my opinion has a scope that extends far beyond being just a model for the organisation of production.
For a long time industrialisation has served as a metaphor for the organisation of human society. Many institutions use standardisation and the concept of the assembly line as methods to increase their efficiency and effectiveness.
Now that a shift is taking place in the manner in which we think about industrial production, in that the assembly line of Taylor is making way for the philosophy of flexible production, other systems for which Taylorism has stood as a model (such as education, public administration and the administration of justice) are also up for review.
Such a development should become the start of a cultural change of human organisation and human action, a change of a culture - which conditions human thinking and action - towards a culture in which creativity and solidarity become the main driving forces and guiding principles and the vehicle for the necessary institutional reforms. * What now are the conclusions from the foregoing? First of all, globalisation is an irreversible process unfolding in the world and it is characterised by increased economic, political and social interaction between states, peoples and individuals. Although its impact extends beyond all areas of human activity, the fundamental idea behind this process is an economic one. Therefore globalisation viewed from a national point of view means the improvement of one’s own capacity as a country to be competitive in this changing world. A key factor in achieving this is a new philosophy of human organisation and human action in order to get away from the fossilisation from which our society suffers. A factor equally important is the orientation towards international standards and regional interests supportive to an aggressive policy aimed at the best possible capitalisation on the added value of co-operation with other countries.
How this globalisation process in the world will work out in the long run depends amongst other things on whether the growing moral awareness in the world community will lead to the acceptance of the principle of social justice which aims at achieving greater equality between states and peoples. Whether this will take place within the new world dynamics, we do not know, but it should not prevent us from making the strategic choice as a country whether we globalise ‘by default or by design’.
I think we should choose to globalise on the basis of a well-considered own design, ‘by design’ that is. This includes active participation in regional organisations, which in general become increasingly important as actors on the newly unfolding world scene as a result of globalisation. But it also entails institutional reforms in line with the region’s and the ‘new world’ outlook, and at the same time in keeping with our own desired vision of society. A societal outlook in which the principle of social justice is embedded and which aims at a better and equal distribution of welfare and well being between citizens. A society in which participation of citizens in policy and administration matters should also be achieved and in which the human individual is considered to be the driving force of development. And lastly a society in which the organisation of structures centres on a portrayal of mankind as ‘the creative, social self’.
Our University can play an important role in the realisation of this design by focussing on ‘learner action and experimentation’ instead of ‘instruction’ and by promoting uniqueness instead of uniformity of the human individual in the use of his intellectual powers. This now is an appropriate challenge, because in concluding with a wink to Jan Slauerhoff’s first two stanzas of the poem entitled ‘het boegbeeld: de ziel’ - the figurehead: my contention is that the soul of the university is not so much the homo economicus, who only reacts to external phenomena such as demand and supply without one’s own will or without any goal of its own, but that of the homo sapiens who consciously makes choices on the basis of his own insights and opinions and who can trigger big leaps of social progress and innovation under supportive conditions. And I quote:
The figurehead: the soul
This is my fate: sculpted for the bow,
The ship’s hull to follow in my wake;
My victorious passage over kneeling waves
Thanking the ship that carried me.
Indeed I prefer wandering to enjoying immovable
Countryside happiness, which roots like a tree
In one fidelity, to one horizon; my three-master
Carries me in the drift of every world current. *** | | |
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